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Abstract
This article reframes the debate on the consequences of flexibilization in European
labour markets focusing on the unexplored impact of temporary employment on oc-
cupational wages for permanent workers. Exploiting the variation in the temps’ den-
sity within occupation and age groups across European countries between 2003 and
2010, we find that temporary contracts negatively affect occupational average
wages for insiders’ workers. These results are still robust using a dynamic system
based on generalized method of moments (GMM-SYS) to account for potential
endogeneity issues. We also explore the existence of heterogeneity across different
occupational clusters and institutional settings. Our estimates indicate that the
knock-on effect is large in countries with low employment protection legislation and
it is driven by occupations characterized by untechnical work logics.
Key words: skills, labour market institutions, flexibility, occupations, income distribution,
employment
JEL classification: J24, J31, J42
1. Introduction
Since the 1980s, European governments have pursued asymmetric reform of the employ-
ment protection legislation (EPL) as one of the major policy responses to the increase of un-
employment rate (Boeri, 2011). The new employment ‘deregulatory’ rules were mostly
oriented to ease employer constraints on the sole use of temporary employment contracts
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while keeping fairly unaltered labour turnover costs of permanent workers (Bentolila and
Dolado, 1994; Esping-Andersen, 2000).
Initial studies on the consequences of EPL changes suggested that flexibilization im-
proved labour market performance, promoting job creation through the reduction of work-
ers’ firing costs (Saint-Paul et al., 1996; Houseman, 2001). In contrast, recent empirical
research has shown that the partial labour market deregulation undertaken by European
governments, liberalizing the sole use of temporary contracts, generated a transitory stage of
employment growth characterized by an increase of unstable and unsecured jobs (Boeri and
Garibaldi, 2007).
The policy consensus seems to suggest that if the next best option for temporary workers
is unemployment or inactivity, then fixed-term contracts can provide them with some bene-
fits (Hamersma et al., 2014). Against this argument, some scholars have objected that labour
market deregulation has created new jobs (Avdagic and Salardi, 2013), while it potentially
has induced a substitution between permanent and temporary workers (Jahn and Weber,
2016)—the latter being easier to dismiss.1 In addition, a new stream of socio-economic liter-
ature acknowledges that this perms–temps substitution has a detrimental impact both on the
employment opportunities of standard workers and on their bargaining power
(Emmenegger et al., 2013). The main proposition here is that labour market dualism is taken
to induce a price competition between labour market segments once EPL reforms lower only
the labour costs of temporary workers (Marx, 2015). In this respect, a number of studies
have predicted that temporary workers, who generally receive lower pays (Brown and
Sessions, 2005) and minimize employer’s turnover and firing costs (Bentolila and Dolado,
1994), potentially create a considerable wage pressure on permanent employees
(Koutentakis, 2008; Alemán, 2009; Beissinger and Baudy, 2015). The threat of temporary
workers is then supposed to foster insiders’ wage moderation and weaken perms’ downward
wage rigidity (Marx, 2015). Under these circumstances, we can expect a negative impact on
the economic standards of employees with a permanent contracts (Koutentakis, 2008;
Eichhorst and Marx, 2011) and, therefore, a potential reduction of permanents workers’ re-
muneration (Baccaro and Benassi, 2017).2
The predictions above support the argument that the increase of atypical contracts trig-
gers downward competition between insiders and outsiders, leading to the aforementioned
potential decrease in the wages of permanent workers. We extend the reasoning and ques-
tion the existence of a de facto wage rigidity for regular workers, insofar given as a conven-
tional wisdom. We hypothesize instead an unanticipated knock-on effect: a raise in the
spread of temporary workers is likely to represent a crucial channel through which perma-
nent workers, who generally have better paid positions, may face a reduction in their bar-
gained wage.
In this article, we reframe the debate about the economic consequences of labour market
flexibility, investigating whether and under what conditions the diffusion of temporary em-
ployment contributes to the deterioration of insiders’ wage. We question the broadly shared
1 The empirical stream of socio-economic research has widely addressed the impact of flexibilization
of labour market on perms–temps wage differentials and temps’ earnings instability (Gash and
McGinnity, 2007; Picchio, 2008; Bellani, 2009; Cervini-Plá and Ramos, 2012; Bosio, 2014).
2 The perms’ wage reduction would, in turn, undermine the redistribution between capital and labor.
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consensus on the impermeability of economic boundaries between core workers and mar-
ginal workers, and we introduce an analytical framework that attempts to address the driv-
ing forces underneath the association between temporary employment and perms’ wage.
Our main analytical innovation consists in the study of the relationship between temporary
employment and the economic reward of protected workers considering its potential hetero-
geneity across occupations. Borrowing from the contributions of Autor et al. (2003, 2013)
in economics and from the work logics framework proposed by Oesch (2006) in sociology,
we focus on the notion of replaceability between perms and temps as a function of the capi-
tal-labour complementarities.
In detail, we make two main contributions to the literature on the consequences of la-
bour market flexibility.
First, we engage in a critical discussion on the theories of dual and segmented labour
markets, which are the dominant paradigms in the literature of the last decades, and we con-
trast them with the notion of temps–perms replaceability to capture how temporary workers
may exert an impact on perms’ economic conditions. By identifying the concentration of
temporary contracts in age–occupation–years cells across countries as a proxy of the level of
perms–temps replaceability, we empirically analyse to what extent the diffusion of atypical
workers affects the occupational wages of insiders’ workers. To the best of our knowledge,
no previous study has measured this impact in a comparative way. In particular, while theo-
ries of dual and segmented labour markets treat workers with different contractual forms as
distinct and not as (easy) replacements of each other, our intuition is that the substitution be-
tween the two segments is intrinsic to the nature of the job, that is, in terms of skill-specific
workers’ position within the division of labour. One possible hypothesis is that the economic
returns of the insiders nested in certain occupations are more responsive to the share of tem-
porary workers; to test this reasoning, we identify the degree of replaceability between
perms and temps, mirroring in large part of the literature on work logics (Oesch, 2006).
Secondly, we consider another potentially relevant factor influencing the extent to which
the share of temporary workers affects permanents’ wages, the heterogeneity across coun-
tries in terms of job security regulation. The challenge here is to understand whether labour
market institutions are likely to stimulate or weaken the opportunity for firms to substitute
perms with temps. Rigid protection legislation, creating ‘beneficial constraints’ (Streeck,
1989), can make low-cost production strategies unfeasible, inducing a decline in replaceabil-
ity between the two segments of labour market. This should de facto maintain the bound-
aries between core and marginal workers.3
In our empirical analyses, we consider different skill cells defined at age–occupation level
across European countries for each year from 2003 to 2010. Each cell represents a differenti-
ated ‘local’ labour market characterized by specific occupational skills that limit workers’
movement between occupations. An increase of temps’ density in a specific cell is likely to
modify the degree of competition between perms and temps by giving employers more
3 Intuitively, the presence of a rigid job security regulation can lower the elasticity of substitution be-
tween labor and capital and, indirectly, can also weaken the gains for the firm associated with the
substitution of perms with temps (Hijzen and Swaim, 2010). This emphasizes the role of institutional
setting as one potential driver of the relationship between the spread of temporary jobs and insiders’
wage claim (Van der Wiel, 2010).
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options to replace regular with contingent workers. Consequently, the substitutability be-
tween the marginal and core workers may undermine permanent workers’ wage claims,
even partly losing their economic rents. Using this analytical structure, we can investigate
the existence and magnitude of a knock-on effect on perms’ wages generated by a rise in the
fraction of temps along the occupational lines.
Under certain conditions, our results seem to argue against a strict dualization of labour
markets. Overall, permanent employees are more likely to experience a wage penalty in
occupations characterized by a growing incidence of temps. This effect is detectable even af-
ter controlling for potential confounding factors related to the demographic composition of
the labour market (e.g. gender, cohort and immigrants’ share) and to perms’ bargaining
power (e.g. average occupational tenure, distribution of firm size and unionization rate). To
deal with potential bias in the association of interest, we implement a dynamic GMM sys-
tem, relying on multiple moment conditions in a time-lag structure of our model. This ap-
proach reduces simultaneity bias while taking into account temporal persistence in the effect
of temps’ density on perms’ occupational wages. Thus, the results obtained provide support
for the knock-on effect.
Our general conclusion is that the temps’ share leads to a negative impact on permanent
wages across local labour markets. Our findings reveal key differences between occupational
groups. Interpersonal but also organizational work logics represent portions of the labour
market where the knock-on effect is evident, while this is not the case for technical work log-
ics, thus confirming that the nature of jobs matters for the level of temps–perms competition.
Moreover, after controlling for country-specific trends, only permanent employees in coun-
tries characterized by low EPL experience a wage reduction when the share of temporary
workers increases. Similar results hold when we interact measures of the degree of labour
market flexibility with the occupational dimension. In short, we find that an institutional set-
ting characterized by rigid EPL seems to protect insiders’ rewards from the competition of a
growing share of temporary contracts. These findings lead us to conclude that both the
work logic framework and the institutional perspective are particularly instructive to under-
stand which factors strengthen the wage loss of insiders in a context of increasing temporary
employment.
Our results provide novel insights on the relationship between the reduction of beneficial
constraints (Streeck, 1997) and the impetus of low-cost production strategies. The analysis
of the knock-on effect also sheds light on the mechanisms that, together with the technical
progress and the globalization of markets (Guscina, 2006; Bengtsson and Ryner, 2015), gen-
erate the current distribution of factors share (Damiani et al., 2018).4
The present study is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the main theories on
labour market segmentation and present our critical approach. Section 3 describes the mech-
anisms behind the knock-on effect. In Section 4, we outline our empirical strategy, the data
and the descriptive statistics. In Section 5, we present our empirical results. Finally, in
Section 6, we draw the conclusions of our analyses.
4 This argument is in line with recent studies on the decline of labour share. These suggest a negative
association between deregulation on temporary contracts and three specific factors such as the en-
try wages for protected workers (Ordine and Rose, 2016), the bargaining power of unions and the la-
bour share (Damiani et al., 2018).
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2. Shortcomings of labour market theories on temporary jobs
Several studies have provided clear evidence of socio-economic penalties associated with
temporary contracts in many European countries. On the other hand, there is a lack of
research on a potential ‘knock-on effect’ of temporary employment on economic condi-
tions of permanent workers. This unanticipated effect seems at odds with the core pre-
dictions inherent in dualistic and segmented labour market theories. We review these
theoretical models to provide an organized view of their approaches and of their poten-
tial limitations.
The core idea of dual and segmented labour market theories is that specific groups of
workers are excluded from internal/primary labour markets. Such exclusion results in the
formation of two segments of the workforce that differ in terms of job stability, economic
returns and career prospects. To our knowledge, there is no univocal definition of labour
market divisions in the existing literature. As we will discuss below, various theoretical
strands have differed in the conceptualization of dualism constructs in the labour market.
The most important in the literature has been the Insiders–Outsiders theory and the Labour
Market Segmentation theory.
2.1 The Insiders–Outsiders theory
The Insiders–Outsiders (I–O) theorists claim that, at the firm level, a group of workers, the
insiders, performing individually valuable and specific firm tasks, is less exposed to market
mechanisms compared to their outsider counterpart (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988)—that
Rueda (2006) explicitly identifies with fixed-term workers (and unemployed). In other
words, the dominant view within the I–O literature conceptualizes a dualism in the labour
market. Such dualism mainly consists of a divide between perms and temps concerned with
firm-level practices. As I–O theory proponents have argued, while flexible workers have a
lower attachment to the firm and, hence, a lower firm-specific human capital (thus a lower
productivity) (Becker, 1964), this is not the case for permanent workers, given their higher
survival probability in the firm (Jahn et al., 2012). Thus, it is expected that higher investment
in specific firm tasks and perms’ higher survival probability will ensure perms a greater bar-
gaining power and a privileged position (given their high firing costs) that will positively af-
fect their rent-optimization capacity (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994; Sorensen, 1994;
Polavieja, 2003). Temporary workers (as outsiders) are seen detached from or only partially
included in the bargaining process within firms (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994; Broschak
et al., 2008)—given that they are unable to bid down the insiders’ wage. Due to these bar-
riers, they are forced to accept contracts characterized by lower (hiring and) firing costs.
Some scholars have claimed that this theoretical construction is not fully convinced.
They argue that the relative value of firm-specific skills has partly deteriorated in a context
characterized by a growing technological change (Longhi and Brynin, 2010). In this type of
context, general skills (Iversen and Soskice, 2001) portable across jobs (e.g. communicative)
assume a higher value in the labour market compared to non-transferable (specific) skills
(Autor, 2010)—that are marketable only in a single firm or in a specific industrial sector.
Under such circumstances, returns to occupational skills are better predictors of wages than
employee’s tenure (Zangelidis, 2008, Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009). Hence, it is no lon-
ger defensible the assumption of I–O framework that firm skill specificity, bound to a certain
context, increases perms’ economic rewards (Kahn, 2012).
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2.2 The Labour Market Segmentation Theory
The Labour Market Segmentation theory, both in its economic and in its institutional var-
iants, recognizes the existence of dualism as a structural feature of labour markets
(Doeringer and Piore, 1971). Contrary to the I–O model, it posits that the segmentation is
associated to demand-side factors (demand fluctuation in the product market) more than to
supply-side (personal characteristics of the workers, such as job tenure) (Piore, 1980). The
Labour Market Segmentation theory is characterized by two variants that we refer to eco-
nomic and institutional perspectives.
The economic perspective of the Labour Market Segmentation theory emphasizes that,
due to the volatile and cyclical components of the market, demand plays a major role in the
segmentation of workers. Accordingly, only employees nested in the primary segment are
guaranteed, while those of the secondary segment are not—since they absorb demand fluctu-
ations. This theoretical construct is based on the concept of occupational skill divide be-
tween workers. Workers of the primary segment have usually higher qualification and ‘good
jobs’, while the others, characterized by a low level of qualification, represent a buffer stock
that is volatile by definition. The occupational skill divide thus leads to a reinforcement of
the barriers between the two groups (Doeringer and Piore, 1975).
Recent studies, however, have stressed that the use of non-standard contracts has pro-
duced unanticipated effects related to the perms/temps dualism (Wrenn, 2016). Accordingly,
recent features of labour market segmentation have led to an increase of the spread of tem-
porary workers across occupations, encompassing a diverse set of work arrangements and
skills requirements (Polavieja, 2006; Marx, 2015). The growing incidence of temps across
occupational categories has modified the structure of opportunities for both high- and low-
skilled permanent workers (Lautsch, 2002; Ashford et al., 2007). This, in turn, has
prompted an alteration of the competition between the two segments of the labour market
also in terms of economic returns (Vough et al., 2005; Pedulla, 2013)—that was not pre-
dicted by the economic perspective of the Labour Market Segmentation theory.
The institutional perspective of the Labour Market Segmentation theory adds a new ele-
ment to the debate. Accordingly, the segmentation is the direct result of the changes oc-
curred to the ‘institutional rules’ under which labour markets operate. In this sense, labour
market legislation may exert a pressure for temps’ diffusion independently from the fluctua-
tions in product labour demand. In the simplest version of the institutional approach to seg-
mentation, the features of labour market (de)regulation are seen as largely exogenous.
Another variant of the institutional perspective of this theory, the so-called core-periph-
ery framework (Kalleberg, 2001; Cappelli and Neumark, 2004), states that the regulatory
context of dismissal costs and the level of inclusiveness of collective bargaining are tied to
permanent workers’ bargaining power that pursues the so-called ‘buffering strategy’ (Piore,
1980). In this sense, permanent workers benefit from a stronger bargaining power especially
for the institutionalized higher firing costs attached to their contracts—both in terms of sev-
erance payments and procedural difficulties. Accordingly, temporary contracts, circumvent-
ing EPL and avoiding firing costs, protect perms’ bargaining power also in the case of
market volatilities (Gebel and Giesecke, 2011). The rent optimization capacity of perms is
expected to be associated with the dimension of the buffer stock of temporary jobs (Dolado
et al., 2002). Given that firms can fire temps without any costs, the greater the share of tem-
porary workers (external flexibility), the less convenient it will be for firms to dismiss perms
(Bentolila and Dolado, 1994).
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The institutional view of segmentation, however, has been recently questioned for its in-
ability to account for unanticipated effects related to the deregulation of the sole use of non-
standard contracts (Wrenn, 2016). Since labour market deregulation has made more conve-
nient for employers to replace permanent staff with cheaper workers (Koutentakis, 2008),
the use of fixed-term contracts has become more and more widespread, thus representing a
threat also to standard employees’ job security (Kraimer et al., 2005; De Cuyper et al.,
2009).
These criticisms remind to the predictions of the Radical Political Economy. According
to this framework, the alternative forms of job protection mirror employers’ strategy to rule
employees by cultivating divisions within the working class (Marglin, 1974). Throughout
the differentiation of contractual forms, employers attempt to fragmentize the employees’ in-
terest and to reduce the propensity of workers for collective actions, leading to severe divi-
sions between employees (Gordon et al., 1982, p. 288). Thus, the intuition at the core of the
Radical Political Economy seems to be illustrative of the recent process of erosion of pro-
tected positions—that are increasingly replaced by temporary workers (Platt, 2003;
Damiani et al., 2018). Pursuing the principle of ‘divide et impera’, perms’ power to maintain
control over the ability of firms to hire temporary workers is expected to decrease—at least
partially (Tilly and Tilly, 1998; Cappelli, 2001). To contrast strategically the threat of
greater external flexibility, perms may opt to accept more flexible working time and to limit
the labour cost differentials (Vough et al., 2005; Eichhorst and Marx, 2011). In this sense,
the expectation of the Radical Political Economy offers a theoretical argument for the emer-
gence of the knock-on effect. However, the adoption of this employers’ strategy acting to di-
vide labour force may depend, among other factors, on the degree of replaceability of perms
with temps within occupations. According to Beissinger and Baudy (2015), an increase of
the incidence of temporary workers due to flexibilization policies can force permanent work-
ers to accept lower wages only if temporary workers are substitutes; if temps, instead, are
complementary to perms in production, flexibilization may boost perms’ wages. At this re-
gard, Koutentakis (2008), employing a dynamic model of the dual labour market with ad-
justment costs, shows that the diffusion of temporary employment potentially carries out a
negative spillover on job security of permanent workers. If the wage differentials between
perms and temps are higher than the discounted firing costs, firms, under certain conditions,
will find more convenient temporary work than the permanent one. Intuitively, these find-
ings imply a sort of upper bound on the wage that insiders can bargain over and reflect po-
tential channels through which the traditional trade-off between remuneration and security
gap operates.
On that point, we consider occupational labour market as a key dimension to frame our
analysis since the degree of substitution or complementarity is likely to vary according to the
occupational characteristics and to the institutional setting. In this sense, the adoption of the
model of ‘occupational labour markets’ ensures a more comprehensive analysis of the effects
of temporary employment on the wage structure and is more suitable to examine whether la-
bour market dualism makes perms less, and not more, rewarded.
To sum up, our hypothesis is that, overall ‘permanent workers should experience a re-
duction of their wages associated with an inflow of temporary jobs. This should be the case
for those employed in occupational labour markets characterized by a higher degree of
perms–temps replaceability’. As we will explain below, we expect that the strength of the
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relationship of interest will principally depend on the nature of the work and on the institu-
tional setting.
3. The occupational dimension of temporary employment
3.1 The role of work logics and EPL
As explained in the previous section, we expect that, among other factors, the level of repla-
ceability of perms with temps within occupational labour markets is likely to impact on per-
manents’ wage. More specifically, we predict that the incidence of temporary workers is
likely to exert a wage penalty for permanent workers but that this should depend on the de-
gree of substitutability between the two groups of workers at the occupational level.
According to the recent literature on occupational change, the level of replaceability of
permanent with temporary workers within occupations is associated to three main factors
such as (a) labour supply-demand conditions, (b) type of skills required (demand-side attrib-
utes) and (c) perms’ bargaining power. Depending on the dimension considered, substitution
or complementarity between temps and perms would prevail.
As shown by socio-economic studies, in the last decade, the demand for high- and low-
skilled occupations has increased, while the demand for jobs with medium-skilled level has
declined (Goos and Manning, 2007). In this sense, some occupations have been hit by posi-
tive shocks, while others by negative ones (Nickell and Saleheen, 2009). The trend in the in-
cidence of temporary workers may be associated, at least for some occupational groups,
with a positive demand shock. Since new entrants are more often employed under temporary
contracts, it is likely that a positive shock is associated with an increase in the incidence of
temporary workers. Besides, it may also be the case that temporary workers enter the labour
market because of supply shocks. In both cases, an increase in the labour supply could force
permanent workers to moderate their wage claims—due to the labour cost differentials be-
tween the two groups of workers.
Moreover, we expect differences in the level of replaceability between perms and temps
depending on the occupational group considered. According to the literature on occupa-
tional heterogeneity of post-industrial societies, specific job attributes should alter the em-
ployment and economic consequences of an increase in temporary employment (Marx,
2011; Reichelt, 2015). Besides the job characteristics related to skills (vertical differentia-
tion), the widely cited framework by Oesch (2006), emphasizing the importance of work
logics (horizontal differentiation) for the categorization of occupations, can help to analyse
whether occupational attributes modify the knock-on effect. According to Oesch (2006),
jobs are characterized by horizontal structure along four dimensions such as the setting of
the workplace, the relations of authority, the primary orientation of the worker and the skill
requirements that, in turn, identify three different work logics such as the technical, the orga-
nizational and the interpersonal work logics. The argument here is that certain work logics
give more incentives to employers to offer non-standard employment contracts and these, in
turn, influence the incidence of non-standard work on the bargaining power of perms
(Marx, 2011). More specifically, the degree of substitution is expected to be related to
whether an occupation is characterized by a direct face-to-face exchange between worker
and people’s need (interpersonal work logic), by strict parameter of work process (organiza-
tional work logic), or by a development and use of technical skills (technical work logic).
Perms employed in occupations characterized by an interpersonal work logic (such as
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routine service workers or nursing aides), attending directly customers’ or patients’
demands, work autonomously and are not strictly integrated in a complex division of labour
or in a structured career path. Their competencies, relying primarily on social and communi-
cative skills, are portable across different job positions and are not bound to a specific orga-
nization. Hence, perms in this work logic are expected to be replaceable by temporary
workers. The predictions are slightly different for perms placed in organizational work logic
(such as routine office clerks). These are usually employed in administrative and clerical
tasks on different hierarchical levels in the large bureaucratic organization with the idiosyn-
cratic organizational procedure. The main competencies are associated with general skills,
like coordinative and clerical, which, by definition, are portable and replaceable. However,
compared to workers in interpersonal work logic, careers are more structured, also due to
the existence of internal labour markets integrated into specific technology and regulation.
Hence, flexible workers are partially attractive for employers and represent, only to a certain
degree, a valid substitution to perms. The level of substitutability between perms and temps
is expected to be low for workers in jobs related to the production of goods, especially for
those in high value-added industries (technical work logic). Here, workers are employed in
the production process with a high level of complexity that requires continuous feedback by
costumers. In addition, they perform specific tasks that are strictly related to the job of the
other members of the work team (e.g. freight handlers). These elements make insiders less
substitutable from external workers (Marx, 2011).
Finally, the level of substitution may depend also on insiders’ bargaining power, defined
as the capacity of permanent workers to maximize their economic return. In the context of
coordinated labour markets (Soskice, 1990), collective actions and institutions are expected
to shape the degree of substitution between the two groups of workers (Polavieja, 2003;
Jahn and Weber, 2016). In particular, the job security regulation can have a crucial impact
on the level of replaceability and, therefore, on regular employees’ wage bargaining
(Vlandas, 2013). High levels of job protection for permanents workers (i.e. high dismissal
costs) may be associated with a low chance of replaceability of perms with temps, especially
when temporary contracts are synonymous of unsecured jobs. In addition, since a higher job
protection motivates employees to acquire more specific skills, rigid labour markets are
likely to reduce the variability of future income (Iversen, 2005, pp. 9–12). These conditions
may decrease perms’ fear of job losses, thus preventing downward pressures on wage
claims.
4. Methodology and data
4.1 Empirical strategy
In our empirical framework, we estimate the relationship between the temporary contracts’
density and the average occupational wage for permanent workers. As discussed above, tem-
porary workers could be poor substitutes for permanent workers within each age–occupa-
tion cell across countries, due to their lower productivity (Addessi, 2014) and their limited
bargaining power (Gebel and Giesecke, 2016). On the other hand, temps and perms could
be perfect substitutes so that occupation-specific wages may be affected by an inflow of tem-
porary contracts within occupational labour markets. To investigate the implicit degree of
replaceability between temps and perms across distinct occupational profiles, we frame our
analysis on skill cells represented by the combination of two-digit occupation codes (using
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the International Standard Classification of Occupation - ISCO88), two age groups across
European countries over time. Therefore, each cell corresponds to a differentiated local la-
bour market (Cohen-Goldner and Peserman 2006; Caines et al., 2017).
Our empirical strategy allows us to examine the effects of variations in the fraction of
temporary employment on changes of insiders’ average wages within the same local labour
market. Thus, we seek to achieve identification by exploiting the cross-sectional variation in
the share of temps within each skill cell. As in Bosch and Ter Weel (2013) and in Stops
(2014), we do not expect individuals to move between occupational labour markets, even in
the case of a relative oversupply. In fact, in the short-run, occupational mobility is restricted
because it requires a large investment in training. In turn, this reduces the worker’s ability to
react to changes in the structure of occupational wages. The age dimension is also crucial to
define local labour markets since it has been shown to predict the level of perms’ wage pre-
mium (Kahn, 2016).
To capture the hypothesized knock-on effect of temps’ density on perms’ wages, we de-
fine our baseline estimating equation as follows:
lnðwajctÞ ¼ aþ dTEMPDENSajct þ bXajct þ hXjc þ cajt þ cct þ ajct (1)
where a indexes age group, j occupation at two-digit level, c countries and t years.
Specifically, the dependent variable ln(wajctÞ is the (natural) logarithm of nominal average
hourly wage for permanent workers measured for each age–occupation cell across countries
and years. The explanatory variable TEMPDENSajct is the fraction of temporary workers
on the total employees in each local labour market.5 The vectors Xajct and Xjc include con-
trols for average demographic characteristics (for each cell) and for other potential con-
founders capturing perms’ bargaining power. In particular, we control for the shares of
male perms, college graduates, and migrants, as well as firm dimension, average tenure and
unionization rate.6
The controls for perms’ bargaining power are here discussed in detail as follows:
 The firm dimension within cell is defined as the share of permanent workers employed in
firms with no more than 10 employees in each age–occupation–country–year cell. The ex-
istence of an effect of firm size and internal careers on perms’ wages as well as on the use
of temporary work is well documented (Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller, 1999).7
 The share of migrants within cell is defined as the relative fraction of workers who are
migrants, calculated for each age–occupation–country–year cell. There exists an extensive
5 Given that the explanatory variable ‘temps’ density’ in the first percentile of the distribution is equal
to zero, our explanatory variable is the level of temps’ share, avoiding logarithm transformation that
reduces the sample size. However, as a robustness check, we provide a specification in which
temps’ density is defined in logarithm in order to interpret it as an elasticity. We use as synonymous
of temps’ density, the term ‘temps’ share as well as the term “concentration of temporary workers”’.
6 With the exception of the unionization rate calculated at the occupation–country level, all other con-
trol variables are defined at the age–occupation–country–year level.
7 Traditionally, literature on the relationship between firm dimension and employees’ wage has sup-
ported the thesis that large employers generally share the excess profits with their workers to avoid
or mimic unionization. In this way, they also try to substitute high monitoring costs by higher wage
premia. Empirical studies only partially confirmed these traditional arguments (Schmidt and
Zimmerman, 1991).
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stream of empirical studies that emphasize the potential effect of migration on wages as
well as on the likelihood of having a temporary contract (Card, 2001; Kogan, 2011;
D’Amuri and Peri, 2014).
 The average job tenure within cell is defined as the average number of years employees
spent in the same job position in each age–occupation–country–year cell. This control
captures the specific differences in the occupational wages of perms that can be explained
by the distribution of job tenure, which could be significantly different from one occupa-
tion to another (Sullivan, 2010).
 The unionization rate at occupation–country level is defined as the share of workers that
are trade union members in each occupation–country cell. The rationale is that a larger
fraction of union members could reflect higher insiders’ bargaining power to increase
wages in each local labour market (Fitzenberger et al., 2013).8
In the model, we have included also an age–occupation–year fixed effect, cajt, and a coun-
try–year fixed effect, cct, to control for the fact that average wages for perms in a local labour
market are traditionally driven by a combination of production factors and unobservable
determinants of wages within age group, occupation, country and year (Caines et al., 2017).
Thus, these fixed effects terms absorb part of the variation in relative wages due to labour de-
mand shocks over time that are age–occupation and country–year specific.
Finally, ajct represents an idiosyncratic error term. We use White-corrected standard
errors to control out for heteroskedasticity and weight each cell by the employment level to
down-weight smaller cells with larger sampling errors.
To check the heterogeneity of the knock-on effect across occupational categories and na-
tional contexts, we re-estimate Equation (1), dividing the sample according to two dimensions
such as work logics and the degree of strictness of employment legislation. In the analysis of the
first dimension, we follow Oesch (2006). who categorizes occupations focusing on horizontal
cleavages. Thus, we divide occupations into three groups such as technical, organizational or in-
terpersonal work logics—for a detailed description of the occupational composition of each
work logic, see Table A1 in the Appendix. Regarding the second dimension, we refer to the
EPL index on regular workers (based on the index developed by the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development - OECD) for each year and country considered. This
index quantifies the ‘procedures and costs’ relative to dismissing permanent employees.9
8 We are aware that the most correct measure would be the union coverage calculated at the occu-
pation–country–year level. Unfortunately, this index is not available and, for this reason, we resort
on the European Social Survey, Round 2 (2004/5), Round 3 (2006/7) and Round 4 (2008/9) information
related to union membership by occupation–country. We also calculate a measure of unionization
based on both actual and past membership. The results, available upon request, are quantitatively
the same.
9 It should be noted that the EPL index on regular and EPL index on temporary work differ radically in
their construction. The EPL on temporary contracts (eplt) measures the procedures and costs of hir-
ing workers on fixed-term, temporary work agency (TWA) contracts. In this sense, eplt reflects the
average of specific regulation, respectively, on temporary contracts and TWA, but the final value
can hide different trends in two specific sub-regulations. Given different weights associated to each
sub-regulation, policymakers and scholars consider this index less robust to capture the ‘real regula-
tion’ on temporary employment. For this reason, following the common procedure in the literature
(Hijzen and Swaim, 2010), in our empirical analysis, we rely on eplr.
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In particular, we construct a dummy reflecting whether a country has high level of EPL on regu-
lar contracts. In this sense, we define a country as rigid (not rigid) when its EPL index on regular
contracts is higher (equal or lower) than the median of the sample of countries included in the
OECD indicator in the same year (D’Amuri and Peri, 2014).10
It should be noted that Equation (1) does not include age–occupation–country as in the
standard panel data analysis. The inclusion of this term would entirely absorb the age–occu-
pation–country variation and the coefficient of interest would be identified only on the lim-
ited within-cell variation across time in the share of temps.11
Despite our effort to account for unobservable determinants of perms’ occupational wages
that could be correlated with the share of temps in each local labour market, potential biases
could still persist. As an example, an age–occupation combination, within a specific time span,
is more concentrated in a sector with better economic performances than the average: under
such condition, the labour demand for the same age–occupation combination is likely to in-
crease. In turn, this concentration can increase the bargaining power of perms nested in this
specific occupational labour market. In this scenario, the controls for country–time and age–
occupation–time fixed effects will not fully capture such specific unobservable determinants. In
addition, occupation-specific wages will be not-fixed in each country but could depend on the
industry composition of employment. To address this issue, we account for potential produc-
tivity shocks in each local labour market, exploiting a demand shift index following Katz and
Murphy (1992) and Moretti (2004). We add to our estimating equation a labour demand shift
index for each specific age–occupation combination based on the industry composition of per-





where Eict reflects the permanent employment at the one-digit industry level i in country c
and year t, while xajc ¼ LajicP
i
Lajic
represents the average share of permanent workers in age
group a and occupation j employed in industry i for each country c over the period 2003–
2010.12 This term reflects a proxy for local labour market conditions as captured by the evo-
lution of labour demand (Katz and Murphy, 1992). We treat this indicator as the predicted
labour demand for perms in a certain age–occupation cell, which is determined, in turn, by
the industry composition of occupations in each country.
4.2 Data description
Our primary data source is the European Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-
SILC) for the years 2003–2010.13 The EU-SILC has been designed with a standard method-
ology to yield comparable information across European countries on several features,
10 We have also implemented a second indicator, exploiting the notion of dual labour market proposed
by Basso et al. (2012). The results (not reported here) confirm our findings.
11 More specifically, a model for the average occupational wages that include only age–occupation–
country fixed effects captures more than 92% of the total variance in the data.
12 In order to reduce potential measurement error issue related to small sample size of some local
labour markets, we constructed the average share of permanent workers in age group a and occu-
pation j employed in industry i for each country c, over the total period 2003–2010, as in Moreno-
Galbis and Tritah (2016) rather than in the initial year.
13 We use EU-SILC cross-sectional data.
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including earnings and labour market conditions. We restrict our analysis to employees
aged 15–55 years, excluding self-employed workers and full-time students.14 We exclude,
from the sample, all employed individuals over 55 years of age to avoid issues related to
early retirement schemes. We also drop self-employed workers because it seems unreason-
able to classify them in terms of contract status. To obtain more reliable measures of labour
market composition, we complement the EU-SILC data with the harmonized individual-
level European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) for the period 2003–2010.15
To estimate the parameters of our model (see Section 4.1), we use data for 13 countries
and 24 occupations over 8 years and two age groups, obtaining a cross-sectional dataset
with at most 4992 (13*24*8*2) observations mapping to four dimensions such as occupa-
tion, age, year and country. The 13 European countries in our study are Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain
and the UK. We exclude workers employed in armed forces and in agricultural and fishery
occupations. To obtain more reliable estimates, we also drop age–occupation–country–year
cells with less than 50 observations in the EU-SILC data, therefore reducing our sample to
3506 local labour market cells.16 Additional details on the number of cells and on occupa-
tional classification are reported in Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix.
4.3 Descriptive statistics
The incidence of temporary employees across selected European countries (EU15) has in-
creased by 3.5% between 1995 and 2010, moving from 11.5% to 14.0%.17 There is, how-
ever, a considerable degree of variation between countries, and they generally diverge from
the aggregate trend, with the exception of France, Germany and Italy (where the incidence
moved from 7.2% to 12.7%). The percentage of temporary employment in Spain strongly
exceeds the European average, even if it decreased from about 35.2% to 25.2% during the
selected period. In other countries, such as the UK, Denmark and Norway, the incidence of
fixed-term contracts remains low.
The share of temporary workers varies significantly also between occupations (Figure 1):
in particular, during the period of analysis (2003–2010), it is higher for health and teaching
professionals, personal and protective services workers, skilled agricultural workers, service
elementary occupations and manufacturing labourers, while it is lower for legislators and
managers, science professionals, science associate and handicraft, craft printing trades work-
ers, stationary plant and related operators and transport operatives. Importantly, we do not
observe any discernible pattern in the concentration of temporary workers in low-skilled
occupations. The distribution of temporary contracts appears not to be structured along any
clear hierarchical differentiation by skill level (Polavieja, 2006; Marx, 2015). Finally, the
14 We exclude also individuals with missing data on wage, occupation and type of contract.
15 We rely on EU-SILC data to construct the dependent variable, perm’s wage. We use EU-LFS to con-
struct temps’ share, the demographic controls (share of male workers and share of college gradu-
ates) the firm dimension, the share of migrants and the average job tenure within cell.
16 In any case, the results are qualitatively the same even if we retain also smaller cells in terms of
sample size.
17 In line with the previous literature, we classify as temporary workers of all individuals who are
employed under a fixed-term contract.
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occupational distribution of temporary workers is mostly constant over time (Figure 2),
with some exception in particular in low-skilled and service occupations.18
We observe a negative association between the temporary contracts’ density across occu-
pations and the logarithm of the average occupational hourly wage for perms (Figure 3).19
This indicates that the average wages for standard workers are lower in occupations with a
relatively high share of temps.
In a similar vein, Table 1 presents the share of temps for each work logic and the mean
values of average perms’ hourly wages (in logarithm). The statistics reported do not provide
clear-cut evidence about the relationship of interest. On one side, we can observe that orga-
nizational work logic is characterized by a lower share of temps and the highest average
hourly wage for perms, and on the other side, the association between the share of temps
and perm’s wage for interpersonal and technical work logics is not consistently negative.20
Clearly, these associations may be due to observed and unobserved factors related to oc-
cupation or the country examined, hiding a spurious correlation between temporary density
Figure 1 Temporary jobs’ concentration by two-digit ISCO classification codes, 2003–2010 and
percentages.
Source: EU-LFS.
18 In the Appendix (Figure A1), we report the evolution of the share of temporary workers by country
over time, differentiating young and adult workers. We can observe that the share of young tempo-
rary workers has increased over time in almost all the countries analysed, while this is true only
partially for adult workers.
19 In Table A4, we report the log wage for temporary and for permanent workers by ISCO code as
well as their difference.
20 In Table 1, we replicate the same analysis, distinguishing also between low- and high-EPL coun-
tries. However, the levels of average occupational (log) hourly wage in the two groups are not en-
tirely comparable given the different scale of variation between the low- and high-EPL countries.
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Figure 2 Share of temporary workers by ISCO and years (%).
Source: EU-LFS.
Figure 3 Box plot of the association between temporary jobs’ concentration and perms’ occupational
wages by quartiles of the distribution.
Source: EU-LFS and EU-SILC.
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and perms’ wages at the occupational level. In the next section, we present a statistical analy-
sis that addresses these limitations that tackle the endogeneity issues related to the concen-
tration of temporary jobs.
5. Empirical results
In this section, we first discuss the impact of temps’ concentration on perms’ occupational
wages by presenting ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of our standard specification.
This analysis is accompanied by additional robustness checks to stress the sensitivity of our
results. Secondly, we investigate whether the overall effect could hide remarkable heteroge-
neities. For this reason, we replicate the analysis by categorizing occupations in different
work logics and considering different institutional settings. In our empirical model, we con-
trol for unobserved heterogeneity at the age-, occupation-, country- and time-level with the
inclusion of age–occupation–year and country–year fixed effects. Standard errors are robust
to the presence of heteroskedasticity.
5.1 The impact of temporary employment at the local labour market
We estimate the impact of the temps’ concentration on insiders’ wages considering country–
occupation–age–year cells. Our estimation results reported in Table 2 are based on the as-
sumption that all workers in a cell compete within the same local labour market.21 OLS
point estimates in columns (1–6) range between 0.174 and 0.121. The coefficients are
statistically significant at 1% with robust standard errors and also after clustering standard
errors at the age–occupation–year level.22 In column (2), we show the results after control-
ling for socio-demographic composition factors within cells, represented by the share of
male workers and the share of tertiary-educated workers.23 In the OLS specification, an
Table 1 Share of temps and average perms’ hourly wage in logarithm by work logics
Interpersonal Organizational Technical
All countries
Share of temps (%) 18.21 11.31 15.01
Perms’ log hourly wage 2.60 2.67 2.46
High-EPL countries
Share of temps (%) 19.66 13.26 16.11
Perms’ log hourly wage 2.45 2.52 2.29
Low-EPL countries
Share of temps(%) 16.89 9.56 13.88
Perms’ log hourly wage 2.73 2.80 2.62
Source: EU-LFS and EU-SILC.
21 In this model, the impact of temporary employment on perms’ wages is assumed identical across
all occupations.
22 The coefficients obtained when clustering standard errors are not reported but are available upon
request.
23 There has been a rapid increase in the average educational attainment of the workforce within oc-
cupation over time as well as a rise in the returns to education. This process has favored a sort of
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increase of temps’ density is generally associated with a negative impact on perms’ wages.
To improve the robustness of our results, we replicate our base model by including addi-
tional controls related to wage bargaining factors. In Column (3), we introduce the share of
perms employed in small firms (less than 10 employees) as well as the fraction of migrant
workers among perms. The estimated temps’ density parameter for this model is 0.119,
which is not different from the estimates of our basic specification while still being statisti-
cally significant at 1%. Similarly, the estimates of model in Column (4), which includes the
Table 2 The effect of temps’ density on permanent’s wages: OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of temps 0.174*** 0.122*** 0.119*** 0.120*** 0.122*** 0.121***
(0.038) (0.036) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Share of male workers 0.384*** 0.379*** 0.379*** 0.373*** 0.375***
(0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Share of college
graduates
0.112*** 0.113*** 0.125*** 0.117*** 0.118***
(0.024) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Share of immigrants 0.042 0.040 0.047 0.048
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.052)




0.278*** 0.273*** 0.272*** 0.269***









Constant 2.032 2.047 2.125 1.507 1.548 1.420
(0.054) (0.051) (0.143) (0.110) (0.111) (0.182)
Age–occupation–year
FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country–year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Laboir demand shift No No No No No Yes
R2 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
N 3506 3506 3252 3252 3252 3252
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the average occupational hourly wage for permanent workers.
We exclude all age–occupation–country–year cells with less than 50 observations. All the regressions are
weighted by the employment level of each cell and include a constant term, age–occupation–year and country–
year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Source: EU-LFS and EU-SILC.
*P< 0.1, **P< 0.05, ***P< 0.01.
educational upgrading among all occupations in the last decades (Goos and Manning, 2007), forc-
ing part of highly educated workers to accept lousier jobs for which they are overqualified
(Chevalier, 2000; Hartog, 2000). Accordingly, to better disentangle the effects of the temporary con-
tracts’ concentration from the evolution of skill requirements, it is relevant to include this control in
our specifications.
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average job tenure of permanent workers by occupation, do not diverge from those reported
in our basic specification. Overall, the temps’ density within occupation–age cells across
countries has a negative and significant impact on perms’ average wages. To further stress
the robustness of results, we add an additional potential confounder to our model: the
unionization rate within country–occupation. Despite the inclusion of this variable in our
model, the negative effect of temps’ density on insiders’ wage is still present and unaffected
in magnitude (Table 2, Column 5). These results suggest that the spread of temporary jobs
in the European labour markets may dampen the insiders’ capability to extract rents, thus
reducing their final wages. The magnitude of the impact is estimated evaluating the wage
effects at the means level: the fraction of temporary employment, on average, reduces perms’
wages of about 2% points (Column 5).
Finally, we consider a further potential confounding factor related to the presence of
unobserved time-varying labour demand shocks. This variation may be correlated with the
fluctuation in the spread of temporary jobs and may influence local labour market condi-
tions. To account for this possibility, we use the industry-driven labour demand shift index
as specified in Equation (2). Again, the coefficient associated with the share of temps is nega-
tive and statistically significant (Table 2, Column 6).
To further stress the sensitivity of our results, we perform three additional checks on our
standard specification. Estimation results are reported in Table 3. First, we use an alternative
cut-off point to define the age groups to test whether the results obtained are driven by our
specific choice of age interval. The rationale is that alternative age thresholds could capture
different trends in labour demand and could, therefore, exert an influence on the relation of
interest. We replicate the analysis by comparing different age brackets for young workers,
defined as those aged 15–30 years (Table 3, Columns 1 and 2). Our results confirm that the
effect of the concentration of temporary jobs on perms’ wages is negative and that the
strength of the relationship is similar to the ones reported in our baseline models (see
Table 2, Columns 5 and 6).
Secondly, we run a model specifying the temps’ concentration in logarithms instead of
levels to capture potential non-linearities in the relationship of interest. For instance, we ex-
pect the impact of the spread of temporary jobs to be more prominent in those occupational
labour markets that are more exposed to non-standard work. The analysis of these non-
linearities is an important contribution, as it allows us to identify the existence of a scale ef-
fect. The estimates, which can be interpreted as elasticities, show a negative and significant
relationship between temps’ concentration and perms’ occupational wages, thus confirming
the robustness of our results (Table 3, Columns 3 and 4).24
Finally, we extend our standard specification to capture heterogeneity across labour mar-
kets, allowing time-varying labour demand shocks to include age-specific, occupation-spe-
cific and country-specific components as well as age-by-occupation, age-by-country and
occupation-by-country fixed effects. In this way, we control for the potential unobservables
that influence the sorting of temps’ in a labour market characterized by better employment
performance (Moreno-Galbis and Tritah, 2016). The results in Columns (5) and (6) of
24 We also replicate all standard analysis h by relaxing the restriction on cells’ size larger than 50 to
be included in the estimation sample. Performing alternative threshold as well as including all the
age–occupation–country cells without any restriction on size leaves the results qualitatively
unchanged. This further confirms the robustness of our results.
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Table (3) indicate that the negative impact of temps’ share on perms’ occupational wages is
still present, even after including these additional fixed effects as control variables.
As expected, the inclusion of additional controls in the regression model leads to a de-
crease in the magnitude of our estimated coefficients. Nonetheless, the estimates remain sig-
nificant. Our analyses suggest that differences in local labour market composition are a key
element to reliably measure the impact of temps’ incidence on insiders’ average occupational
wages. It is important to note that the results presented so far can only be interpreted as a
controlled correlation: OLS estimates do not allow identification of causal relations if biases
due to unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity issues are not addressed. Despite this limi-
tation, we are still confident about the robustness of our results. In fact, the negative sign of
the relationship between temps’ concentration and perms’ occupational wages persists also
in models that control for potential unobserved time-varying productivity shocks and for
the presence of potential sources of bias.
5.2 The heterogeneity across occupational clusters
In the previous section, we have reported that the concentration of temporary jobs nega-
tively impacts the occupational wages for permanent workers and that the magnitude and
Table 3 Robustness check on age cohorts’ definition: OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of temps 0.179*** 0.180*** – – 0.155*** 0.164***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.059) (0.059)
Log (share of temps) 0.017** 0.016**
(0.007) (0.007)
Constant 1.577 1.588 2.976 2.902 3.376 2.842
(0.137) (0.141) (0.185) (0.190) (0.179) (0.176)
Age–occupation–year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Country–year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation–year FE No No No No Yes Yes
Age–year FE No No No No Yes Yes
Age–country FE No No No No Yes Yes
Age–occupation FE No No No No Yes Yes
Occupation–country FE No No No No Yes Yes
Labour demand shift No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.98 0.98
N 2624 2624 2852 2852 3252 3252
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the average occupational hourly wage for permanent workers.
We exclude all age–occupation–country cells across years with less than 50 observations. All the regressions are
weighted by the employment level of each cell. Column (1) replicates the baseline model, by changing age
threshold. More precisely, we distinguish workers aged 15–30 years with those aged 31–55 years. In column
(2), we introduce the logarithm for the share of temps. Column (3) provides an alternative combination of fixed
effects as controls, by including country–time, occupation–time, age–time, age–country, age–occupation and oc-
cupation–country fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Source: EU-LFS and EU-SILC.
*P< 0.1, **P< 0.05, ***P< 0.01.
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sign of this impact are unaffected when using different age groups’ definition. In this section,
we test whether the overall effect may hide a substantial variation across different occupa-
tional labour markets.
Our estimation results reported in Table 4 clearly show that work logics represent a key
channel to capture the occupational heterogeneity of the knock-on effect, albeit its distinct
characteristics lead to variations in the estimated parameters.25 The coefficients associated
with interpersonal work logic are around 0.170. After controlling for the labour demand
shifts, these results imply that the fraction of temps on average reduces permanent workers’
wages of about 3 percentage points for interpersonal work logic, evaluated at the mean of
temps’ density that is around 19% (Table 4, Column 2). A key point is that this group is as-
sociated with occupations demanding a high degree of social and communicative competen-
cies that are less specific and portable across jobs and organizations. It is also associated
with tasks that are not integrated in a complex structure and that are independent from loca-
tion and potential co-workers. The growing incidence of temporary employment within
occupations characterized by interpersonal work logic may, therefore, increase the substitut-
ability between perms and temps, reducing the average wages of permanent workers. This
identifies a knock-on mechanism that is also likely to be present for high-skilled knowledge-
intensive and creative service occupations (Marsden, 2011), both characterized by extended
turnover and unstructured career paths.
We find a different scenario when we examine the relationship of interest in the case of
technical work logic. In this case, the estimated parameters are negative but not statistically
significant (Table 4, Columns 3 and 4). One possible interpretation is that the nature of these
jobs favors long-term career paths in which tenure as well as investment in human capital
play a key role.26 The complexity of the production process characterizing this work logic
requires larger organizational units where internal labour markets and structured career
paths still prevail. At the same time, unions traditionally have stronger bargaining power in
large organizational units, especially in manufacturing sectors, and, in this context, they are
able to preserve rents for insiders through collective agreements at the firm level (Marx,
2011; Beissinger and Baudy, 2015).
In the case of organizational work logic, the coefficients of interest are negative, statisti-
cally significant, and their magnitude is larger compared to the other work logics (Table 4,
Columns 5 and 6). Note that organizational work logic applies to occupations such as clerks
with coordination tasks and workers of large bureaucratic organization (Oesch, 2006). On
one hand, job experience may play a key role for workers nested in this work logic, thus fa-
voring structured and internal careers. On the other hand, the spread of ICT technology and
the diffusion of ‘shared economy’ can facilitate the introduction of common procedures in
large bureaucratic organizations, thus promoting the substitutability between perms and
temps. In such a context, it would be reasonable to find a negative effect on regular employ-
ees’ wages associated with an increase in the incidence of temporary contracts.
In sum, the marginal effect of temps’ concentration at the mean is larger for interpersonal
work logic, around 3.1 percentage points, while it is not statistically different from zero for
technical logic. As expected, the result lies in the middle for organizational logic, with an
25 All equations are weighted by employment of each age–occupation–country cell.
26 It requires a certain degree of skill specificity, by the typical process of learning by doing of these
positions.
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average effect of about 2.9 percentage points. These results are in line with the initial hy-
pothesis that the knock-on effect of temporary jobs’ concentration on perms’ occupational
wages is heterogeneous across work logics. Concisely, our estimates suggest that the job con-
tent might influence the degree of substitutability between perms and temps, which, in turn,
contributes to the ‘penalty’ for insiders’ wages.27
5.3. Differences across labour market institutions: the role of dual EPL
We have shown that mechanisms at the occupational level are able to explain, at least in
part, the asymmetric ongoing trends in the incidence of non-standard employment across al-
ternative skill groups and its impact on the wage structure. However, the institutional
Table 4 The effect of temps’ density on perms’ occupational wages across work logics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interpersonal Technical Organizational
Share of temps 0.170** 0.162** 0.020 0.019 0.295** 0.293**
(0.080) (0.080) (0.050) (0.050) (0.115) (0.115)
Share of male workers 0.094* 0.112** 0.498*** 0.497*** 0.662*** 0.670***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.064) (0.064)
Share of college
graduates
0.159*** 0.170*** 0.186*** 0.184*** 0.286*** 0.277
(0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.060) (0.060)
Share of migrants 0.036 0.030 0.224*** 0.224*** 0.163 0.123
(0.093) (0.093) (0.074) (0.074) (0.288) (0.288)
Share of employed in
firms with less
than 10 employees
0.480*** 0.453*** 0.198*** 0.200*** 0.084 0.101
(0.057) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.091) (0.093)
Average occupational
tenure
0.012 0.003 0.055 0.052 0.010 0.002
(0.039) (0.039) (0.034) (0.035) (0.050) (0.052)
Current unionization
rate
0.031 0.030 0.203*** 0.204*** 0.061 0.074
(0.050) (0.049) (0.033) (0.032) (0.096) (0.097)
Constant 3.337 2.005 2.495 2.509 1.285 1.347
(0.181) (0.195) (0.167) (0.172) (0.286) (0.291)
Age–occupation–year
FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country–year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Labour demand shift No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95
N 1156 1156 1390 1390 706 706
Note: Dependent variable is the logarithm of the average occupational hourly wage for permanent workers. We
exclude all age–occupation–country cells across years that have less than 50 observations. All the regressions
are weighted with the employment level of each cell and include a constant term, age–occupation–year and
country–year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Source: EU-LFS and EU-SILC.
*Significant at 10%, **significant at 5% and ***significant at 1%.
27 In particular, the untechnical nature of the employment cluster appears to be a relevant element to
explain this relation of interest.
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context may play a relevant role as well in explaining the influence of temporary employ-
ment spread on perms’ rents in the European labour market (Hipp et al., 2015).
A relevant question is whether rigid labour regulations dampen the employment competi-
tion between perms and temps, thus reducing the negative impact of temporary employment
on perms’ wages. While the relationship between the level of employment protection and the
incidence of temporary jobs has already been examined (Kahn, 2010), we focus on how in-
stitutional settings affect the relationship between temps’ incidence and perms’ wage in occu-
pational labour markets. The expectation is that a rigid EPL system can offset at least part
of the knock-on effect. As argued in the literature that relates EPL and wages (Van der Wiel,
2010), institutional settings can hinder competition between the two groups and preserve oc-
cupational wages of perms. Ideally, institutional contexts that are characterized by more
stringent employment protection provisions on regular jobs might stimulate firms to hire a
larger share of temps, therefore favoring the duality in the labour market (Hijzen et al.
2017).
After controlling for time-varying occupation and country-level differences by time-fixed
effects, we expect EPL in each country to be a crucial (residual) determinant of perms wages’
dynamics associated with temporary density.
To analyse the role of institutional settings, we re-estimate our standard equation using a
country-level indicator that measures the rigidity of labour market regulation. The rationale
is that strictness in the EPL index on regular employees captures the substitution possibilities
for firms and it can be expected to weaken the degree of replaceability between perms and
temps as the share of temporary contracts increases. In addition, constraints on the use of
temporary jobs have shown relevant changes in the last decades. Therefore, the level of this
index could be misleading as a proxy for labour regulation.28 Most of the countries that
eased EPL on temporary contracts are placed above the mean on EPL for regular work and
have experienced two-tier reforms. Consistently, several theoretical predictions (Boeri and
Garibaldi, 2007) suggest that the rigidity of EPL on regular works seems to influence the
share of temporary employment more than the (rigidity of) EPL on fixed-term contracts.
Table 5 reports the coefficients for high-EPL countries (Columns 1 and 2) and for low-
EPL countries (Columns 3 and 4). For each group, the first column shows our standard spec-
ification [see Equation (1)], while the second column includes the labour demand shift indi-
cator driven by sectoral employment composition. We note that the impact of temps’ share
on perms’ wages is negative and statistically significant only in countries with low levels of
EPL for regular contracts, while in high-EPL countries, the effect is marginally positive.
These results imply that low-EPL countries make easier for firms to recruit temps, fostering
competition between perms and temps, which, in turn, negatively influences wages of regu-
lar workers. In contrast, rigid employment regulations can weaken the process of substitu-
tion and protect the capability of insiders to extract rents. In addition, labour market
rigidities can interact with negative demand shocks, inducing an inefficient reallocation and
larger use of temps as a buffer. This institutional context enhances the duality of labour
28 Addressing the criticism of OECD indicators on EPL and the role of effectiveness in the enforcement
of employment protection regulation, Venn (2009) argued that monitoring is more complicated in the
case of EPL on temporary contracts, given that there exist relevant differences between de facto
and measured protection across countries in the regulation of different forms of temporary
contracts.
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markets, lessening the ability of temps to represent a concrete alternative to insiders. As a re-
sult, the knock-on mechanism in rigid labour markets seems absent. This claim confirms the
theoretical intuition proposed by Koutentakis (2008): if perms’ wages exceed temps’ wages
by an amount higher than the discounted firing costs, then firms facing a negative shock will
react by favoring temporary employment. In other words, the spread of temps introduces de
facto an upper limit on the wages that insiders are able to bargain. This specific limit is con-
sistently lower in countries characterized by less rigid job protection regulation and firing
costs on permanent contracts. Our empirical results are coherent with this theoretical
prediction.29
Table 5 The effect of temps’ density on perms’ occupational wages by institutional setting
High-EPL countries Low-EPL countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of temps 0.135* 0.134* 0.160*** 0.153***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.057) (0.058)
Share of male workers 0.210*** 0.204*** 0.413*** 0.409***
(0.050) 51 (0.054) (0.054)
Share of college graduates 0.438*** 0.434*** 0.013 0.013
(0.046) (0.046) (0.036) (0.036)
Share of immigrants 0.105 0.104 0.281*** 0.283***
(0.079) (0.079) (0.096) (0.096)
Share of employed in firms
with no more than 10
employees
0.213*** 0.221*** 0.198*** 0.210***
(0.073) (0.074) (0.054) (0.055)
Average occupational tenure 0.075** 0.073** 0.132*** 0.123***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.038) (0.039)
Current unionization rate 0.220*** 0.216*** 0.057 0.063*
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038)
Constant 1.123 1.131 2.265 2.310
(0.182) (0.181) (0.178) (0.180)
Age–occupation–year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country–year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Labour demand shift No Yes No Yes
R2 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.94
N 1603 1603 1649 1649
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the average occupational hourly wage for permanent workers.
We exclude all age-occupation-country cells across years with less than 50 observations. All the regressions are
weighted by the employment level of each cell and include a constant term, age-occupation-year and country-
year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported inparenthesis.
Source: EU-LFS and EU-SILC.
*P< 0.1, **P< 0.05, ***P< 0.01.
29 In addition, we test the robustness of our results to an alternative index capturing the two-tier na-
ture of the regulation in the labour market, as anticipated in Section 4.1. The results, available upon
request, are qualitatively similar and confirm the same patterns as in the case of EPL index on regu-
lar work.
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It is widely debated (Eichhorst and Marx, 2015) that labour market institutions do not
equally affect the regulatory regime between occupations. For this reason, the potential pres-
ence of heterogeneous employment practices within a specific institutional setting needs ad-
ditional considerations.30 As our contribution to the debate, we analyse whether the role of
EPL in shaping the knock-on effect varies across work logics. Our goal is to examine the in-
terplay between labour market institutions, occupational heterogeneity and the knock-on ef-
fect. In detail, we estimate our empirical model for different sub-samples of country–
occupation–age–year cells, where subsamples are given by all possible combinations of
work logics (interpersonal, organizational and technical) and EPL regimes (low and high).
Our expectation is that a rigid EPL system can offset, at least partially, the knock-on effect
found for interpersonal and organizational work logics.
The model specification interacting occupational and institutional dimensions leads to
smaller sample size for our analysis, reducing the estimates precision in terms of statistical
significance. For this reason, we restrict our analyses to the sign of the coefficient of temps’
incidence, which we use to characterize how the feature of national EPL regime shapes the
knock-on effect for each occupational profile.31
Our estimation results reported in Table 6 indicate that rigid EPL settings strengthen, at
least partially, the duality of labour market as well as the complementarity between perms
and temps (Columns 1–3). In particular, regular workers in technical work logic seem to
gain from a higher temps’ concentration, with an estimated coefficient of 0.221. This is con-
sistent with the special nature of work in the manufacturing sector, where workers tend to
benefit more in terms of economic returns and employment conditions from the high value
they add in the manufacturing process. The results for perms’ wage in organizational and in-
terpersonal work logics are not statistically significant and do not allow to identify any influ-
ence of temps’ density. In contrast, in low-EPL countries, the institutional context may ease
the replaceability between perms and temps only for interpersonal work logics (Columns
4–6). For this occupational group, in a context of less strict employment legislation, the inci-
dence of temporary jobs seems to negatively affect the wages of insiders, with an estimated
coefficient of 0.253.
In a nutshell, the institutional factor can complement the occupational dimension in iden-
tifying the level of substitutability between perms and temps and the subsequent knock-on
effect. We are aware that small sample size does not help to identify empirical patterns that
are statistically robust. Caution is warranted in the interpretation of these estimates. In addi-
tion, the implementation of adjusted correlation raises several challenges; for instance, the is-
sue that both channels (i.e. work logics and EPL setting) may not only affect the temps’
share in each local labour market, but also the evolution of occupational wages for insiders.
In the next section, we focus on this particular issue and we provide robustness checks to
strengthen the interpretation of our results.
30 Eichhorst and Marx (2015) argued that ‘Institutions may have legal coverage or they enforceability
is low. Therefore, actual employment practices should be expected to depend on additional factors
beyond the legal framework’ (cit.)
31 This clearly pushes up standard errors; for this reason, the coefficient of interest is now not statisti-
cally significant. Since we are estimating an equation with age–occupation–year and country–year
fixed effects, a large part of the data variation is absorbed by the fixed effects.
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5.4 Robustness checks
Endogeneity and omitted variable biases could remain a concern when attempting to recover
a causal interpretation of our estimates. For instance, changes in the temps’ share could be
correlated with changes in unobserved components of wages within the same labour market,
which could occur if temps sorted into occupations where demand grew. In this scenario,
skill requirements related to each form of contract would likely evolve over time across
countries and occupations, affecting simultaneously both the demand for temporary work-
ers and the rewards for insiders. Another potential source of endogeneity arises from the
chance that perms’ wages at time t could be influenced by past demand for temporary work-
ers. In this case, we could expect lagged terms in the relationship between temps’ spread and
insiders’ occupational rewards.
These heterogeneity and endogeneity issues are significant challenges towards the
achievement identification of a causal relationship. Longitudinal fixed effects (FE) models
represent the standard approach to tackle potential unobserved heterogeneity related to
time-invariant characteristics at the age–occupation–country level. As mentioned in Section
4, the inclusion of these fixed effects would absorb almost all the variation in our variable of
interest. For this reason, a fixed-effects approach is not a feasible strategy to improve the ro-
bustness of our estimates. In addition, the use of a fixed-effects model does not allow to con-
trol for potential endogeneity related to the simultaneity between changes in the temps’
share in each local labour market and changes in perms’ occupational wages. Instrumental
variables strategies can address this simultaneity bias and the use of time lags can also pro-
vide useful instruments. We rely on multiple moments conditions in a time-lag structure of
our covariates through the implementation of a dynamic GMM-SYS estimator (Arellano
and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998). This approach is likely to reduce simultaneity
Table 6 The effect of temps’ density on perms’ occupational wages by work logics and
institutions: OLS estimates













Share of temps 0.176 0.226 0.221** 0.253* 0.053 0.072
(0.117) (0.219) (0.092) (0.133) (0.173) (0.057)
Constant 1.716 0.459 0.733 3.107 2.464 2.180
(0.259) (0.462) (0.291) (0.325) (0.454) (0.280)
Age–occupation–
year FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country–year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.93 0.96 0.96
N 561 339 703 595 367 687
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the average occupational hourly wage for permanent workers.
We exclude all age–occupation–country cells across years with less than 50 observations. All the regressions are
weighted by the employment level of each cell and include a constant term, age–occupation–year and country–
year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Source: EU-LFS and EU-SILC.
*P< 0.1, **P< 0.05, ***P< 0.01.
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bias by exploiting statistical moments restrictions between lagged control variables and re-
sidual terms and by combining level and time-differenced information accounting for persis-
tence in labour market conditions in a dynamic framework. The emphasis is on the
relationship between the current and the past structure of the workforce, given that a high
share of temps in the past could impact how the spread of temporary jobs evolves over time
within the same local labour market. In other words, the dynamic GMM-SYS takes into ac-
count temporal persistence in the temps’ share and at the same time correcting for endogene-
ity issues. As argued by Roodman (2009), the advantage of the GMM-SYS estimator is that
the inclusion of time-invariant covariates does not asymptotically influence other estimated
parameters under the assumption of orthogonality between instruments in the level equation
and the time-invariant controls.
We follow the standard approach to estimate GMM-SYS (Giuliano et al., 2017; Damiani
et al., 2018) and consider our baseline specification [Equation (1)], accounting for the unob-
served heterogeneity at the age–occupation–country level and including the same control
variables as described in Section 4. To stress the validity of our estimates, we rely on the test
for over-identification proposed by Hansen (1982) that examines the validity of internal
instruments generated by the estimation procedure. We also implement the Arellano and
Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation, which assumes the absence of second-order autocorre-
lation in the first-differenced residuals and provides a reliability measure for the number of
lags in the model.32
The implementation of a dynamic GMM-SYS allows accounting for persistence in occu-
pational wages and, in turn, improves the identification of the coefficients of interest (Bond,
2002). This class of models represents an ideal strategy to correct potential endogeneity
issues related to the presence of serially productivity shocks that could be correlated with
control variables and to capture potential lags in the impact of temps’ share on perms’ occu-
pational wages.
Estimation results for the dynamic GMM-SYS model are shown in Table (7): in Column
(1), we include country and time fixed effect separately; in Column (2), we introduce stan-
dard country–time fixed effects; and in Column (3), we add the labour demand shift indica-
tor. As in the OLS results, the coefficients associated to the temps’ share show the expected
negative sign and are statistically significant. The larger magnitude of the effect may be re-
lated to both the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity at the age–occupation–country level
and the instrumentation of the GMM approach. Tests for second-order autocorrelation in
the residuals, reported in each column of Table (7), indicate no evidence of additional serial
correlation. Finally, for all regressions, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the valid in-
strument as indicated by Hansen tests.
In conclusion, the estimates from dynamic GMM-SYS emphasize the negative impact of
temps’ concentration on average perms’ wages in each local labour market. These results
seem to confirm the theoretical predictions that an increasing spread of temporary jobs
could reduce perms’ bargaining power and, in turn, their average occupational wages. The
32 We start using a standard two lags approach as internal instruments. Obviously, we are aware that
the time dimension of our data introduces some restrictions on the number of lags in the dynamic
GMM-SYS. However, we test the sensitivity of our results, by implementing higher number of lags
as instrument in the difference equation. The results (available on request) are substantially the
same and the models do satisfy both specification and autocorrelation tests.
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limited time span of our data does not allow to introduce a fully dynamic structure in the
model and to disentangle short- and long-run effects of the variable of interest.
6. Discussion and conclusion
This article has sought to reframe the debate about the consequences of the process of flexi-
bilization on the employment conditions for permanent workers by focusing on the interac-
tion between the incidence of temporary workers and perms’ wages at occupational level. So
far, the dominant views investigating the effects of two-tier reforms have conceptualized la-
bour market as a deep divide between insiders, stable and fully insured employees, and out-
siders, the ‘employment underclass’ overrepresented in cheap labour and unskilled jobs
(Rueda, 2006). Instead of relying on a strict dualism of the two segments, the analytical
framework presented in this article emphasizes the interdependency between the marginal
Table 7 The effect of temps’ density on permanent’s wages: dynamic GMM-SYS estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Share of temps 0.422* 0.617** 0.727**
(0.235) (0.289) (0.313)
Share of male workers 0.117*** 0.103*** 0.101***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.026)
Share of college graduates 0.670*** 0.651*** 0.648***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.024)




Average occupational tenure 0.165*** 0.121** 0.117**
(0.039) (0.048) (0.048)
Current unionization rate 0.227 0.219*** 0.221***
(0.058) (0.063) (0.063)
Constant 1.617 1.874 1.905
(0.202) (0.252) (0.261)
Country FE Yes No No
Time FE Yes No No
Country–year FE No Yes Yes
Labour demand shift No No Yes
Instruments for differences equation Share of temps with lags
Instruments for level equation D (Share of temps)
Hansen J statistics (P value) 7.87 9.51 9.29
(0.547) (0.391) (0.411)
Arellano–Bond AR2 (P value) 0.73 1.37 1.36
(0.466) (0.171) (0.175)
N 3252 3252 3252
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the average occupational hourly wage for permanent workers.
In all specifications, we apply the backward orthogonal deviations transformation to the instruments for the
transformed equation. Instruments are replaced with their deviations from past means.
Source: EU-LFS and EU-SILC.
*P< 0.1, **P< 0.05, ***P< 0.01.
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and the core workers, which is expected to have an unanticipated impact on the position of
regular employees in the bargaining process.33 Recent studies have shown that when the
two segments of the labour market are not analysed in isolation, then an increase of atypical
workers is likely to put pressure on employment opportunities for permanent workers
(Jacobi and Schaffner, 2008, Koutentakis, 2008, Marx, 2015). This, in turn, is likely to gen-
erate a substitution effect of perms with temps (Kahn 2012).
In this article, we challenge another assumption of dual and segmented labour market
theories, namely that the impact of temporary employment commonly reinforces the eco-
nomic rents of insiders. Moving from this perspective, our general approach questions the
idea that temps are complementary to perms, which has traditionally been the reason why
temporary employment has been expected to leave the economic rents of insiders untouched
(Bentolila and Dolado, 1994). Under a process of legislative changes aimed at relaxing em-
ployment protection for the sole use of temporary contracts, firms have seen large increases
in their incentives to replace permanent positions with less costly and more precarious tem-
porary workers (Gebel and Giesecke, 2016). As predicted by the Radical Political Economy,
greater external flexibility is likely to threat the bargaining power of permanent workers.
Following this approach, our analysis investigates whether insiders experience a reduction
in their rents, an effect that we call the knock-on effect. The economic implications of tem-
porary employment on perms’ conditions is expected to depend crucially on the degree of
replaceability between perms and temps (Eichhorst et al., 2013; Cahuc et al., 2016). This, in
turn, is likely to be strictly related to the occupational cluster in which workers are employed
and to the institutional settings in which they are embedded. In particular, the configuration
of the institutional setting related to the EPL (Drager and Marx, 2017), giving more or less
incentives to firms to create temporary jobs, should alter the substitutability between the
two segments.34
To study the knock-on effect and to capture this potential heterogeneity, we consider the
incidence of temps’ on perms’ wages in occupation–age cells across European countries for
the period 2003–2010. The empirical analysis lends support to our main hypothesis that a
larger density of temporary jobs depresses the rewards of permanent employees, consistently
reducing their average occupational wages. Thus, reforms that deregulate the sole use of
temporary jobs, even if intended as normative changes concerning only a marginal fraction
of the labour force, seem rather to entail an unanticipated impact on insiders’ outcomes,
leading to a decrease in their economic returns.
We take a more disaggregated view by unpacking the effect of temps’ concentration for
different employment clusters. Our results reveal that the knock-on effect is more evident in
occupations characterized by non-technical work logic. This is consistent with the predic-
tions of previous studies (Marx, 2011), according to which the employment substitutability
of perms with temps would be most pronounced in work logics, such as interpersonal and
organizational, exhibiting frequent deviations from traditional long-term employment rela-
tions (Collins, 2006). This leads to a higher level of interdependence in the bargaining
33 As in the original formulation of the segmented/dual labour markets, where the two segments of
workers are assumed to be totally segmented and without any sort of interaction (Piore, 1980).
34 A closely related study is Nunziata and Staffolani (2007) that investigates at the macroeconomic
level how the elasticity in the share of temporary jobs to productivity shock is mediated by the dif-
ferent EPL settings.
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process between firm, insiders and outsiders that ultimately may determine a downward
pressure on perms’ wage. This is not the case for technical work logics, where skills specific-
ity seems to ensure a lower level of replaceability. This is enhanced by high transaction costs
for employers in the substitution process between perms with marketable skills and temps.
We also examine the potential role of institutional settings for the knock-on effect. We
show that perms’ (in)ability to negotiate higher wages is strictly connected with labour turn-
over costs. When perms’ firing costs are not prohibitively high for employers (e.g. in coun-
tries with low EPL), insiders and outsiders are more likely to compete (as in Autor’s 2001
model of temporary help firms). Thus, institutional reforms asymmetrically deregulating
temporary employment seem to preserve the wage of permanent workers only in rigid la-
bour markets, thus enhancing dualism in the labour market: given that many countries have
not altered firing costs for permanent workers, employers are not able to replace the primary
segment of the labour market with the secondary one. We remark, however, that this con-
clusion should not be considered as general.
The various empirical pieces presented in our analysis add up to an argument concerning
the long-term change of labour markets and its relationship with the distribution of income
between labour and capital in Western economies. One of the key insights of this study is
that, among other relevant factors, changes in the regulation of labour markets through lib-
eralization of temporary employment can contribute to a deterioration of workers’ wage
conditions, resulting in a competition worse than a zero-sum game.35 While temporary em-
ployment, according to the traditional I–O framework, is expected to generate rents for
insiders, leaving outsiders (i.e. those employed on temporary basis) with lower wages and
bad working conditions, our study suggests instead that the ultimate result is a potential
negative-sum game, where both segments lose bargaining power, possibly in favor of capital
remuneration as predicted by the Radical Political Economists. Notably, the consequent de-
terioration of labour share is in line with the recent decline reported in empirical studies for
developed economies, meaning that labour receives less national income now than in the
past (Guscina, 2006; Krämer, 2011). In this sense, our results are coherent with the argu-
ment that the growing incidence of temporary jobs acts as a potential determinant in the la-
bour share decline (Damiani et al., 2018).
This trend seems to characterize some occupational labour markets in particular, while
others remain untouched. As each occupational group experiences a different degree of
replaceability, the negative wage impact of temporary employment appears associated espe-
cially with jobs involving non-technical work logics.
In conclusion, the upshot of this study is that explaining changes in the European labour
markets requires a better understanding of how occupational clusters react to the flexibiliza-
tion process and to what extent institutional settings can strengthen this relationship. This
article provides a first contribution in this direction, but there is still need for future research
to further clarify the mechanisms behind the effect of temps’ incidence on the evolution of
wages and to address potential limitation related to data availability. Progress in defining
better indexes of occupational classifications and comprehensive labour market institutions
could provide a substantial contribution to enrich the debate among policymakers and
scholars.
35 Empirical studies focused on several aspects concerning the evolution in labour market perspec-
tives, such as globalization, occupational change, technological progress and immigration.
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Appendix
Table A1 Work logics’ classification by ISCO code
Work logics’ classification by ISCO code
Interpersonal
22 Life science and health professionals
23 Teaching professionals
24 Other professionals
32 Life science and health associate professionals
33 Teaching associate professionals
51 Personal and protective service workers
52 Models, salesperson and demonstrators




13 Managers of small enterprises
34 Other associate professionals
41 Office clerks
42 Customer service clerks
Technical
21 Physical, mathematical and engineering professionals
31 Physical, mathematical and engineering associate professionals
61 Skilled agricultural and fishery workers
71 Extraction and building trade work
72 Metal, machinery and related trade work
73 Precision, handcraft, craft printing and related trade worker
74 Other craft and related trade work
81 Stationary plant and related operators
82 Machine operators and assemblers
83 Drive and mobile plant operators
92 Agricultural, fishery and related labourers
93 Labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport
Source: EU-LFS, based on Oesch (2006) classification.
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Table A2 Data availability and sample composition














The UK 2004–2006; 2008–2010 287
Source: EU-LFS and EU-SILC.
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Table A3 Overview and description of ISCO occupation codes available in EU-LFS and EU-SILC
ISCO code Work logics Description
11 Organizational Legislators and senior officials
12 Organizational Corporate managers
13 Organizational Managers of small enterprises
21 Technical Physical, mathematical and engineering professionals
22 Interpersonal Life science and health professionals
23 Interpersonal Teaching professionals
24 Interpersonal Other professionals
31 Technical Physical, mathematical and engineering associate professionals
32 Interpersonal Life science and health associate professionals
33 Interpersonal Teaching associate professionals
34 Organizational Other associate professionals
41 Organizational Office clerks
42 Organizational Customer service clerks
51 Interpersonal Personal and protective service workers
52 Interpersonal Models, salesperson and demonstrators
61 Technical Skilled agricultural and fishery workers
71 Technical Extraction and building trade work
72 Technical Metal, machinery and related trade work
73 Technical Precision, handcraft, craft printing and related trade worker
74 Technical Other craft and related trade worker
81 Technical Stationary plant and related operators
82 Technical Machine operators and assemblers
83 Technical Drive and mobile plant operators
91 Interpersonal Sales and service elementary occupations
92 Technical Agricultural, fishery and related labourers
93 Technical Labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport
Source: EU-LFS and EU-SILC.
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Table A4 Temps’ and perms’ log wage and their difference by ISCO occupation codes
ISCO code Work logics Temps’ log wage Perms’ log wage Difference
11 Organizational 2.94 3.18 0.24
13 Organizational 2.43 2.80 0.37
21 Technical 2.64 3.01 0.37
22 Interpersonal 2.82 3.12 0.30
23 Interpersonal 2.87 3.06 0.19
24 Interpersonal 2.67 2.97 0.30
31 Technical 2.49 2.82 0.33
32 Interpersonal 2.52 2.71 0.19
33 Interpersonal 2.58 2.75 0.17
34 Organizational 2.51 2.74 0.23
41 Organizational 2.33 2.58 0.25
42 Organizational 2.29 2.52 0.23
51 Interpersonal 2.22 2.42 0.20
52 Interpersonal 2.17 2.29 0.12
61 Technical 1.99 2.25 0.26
71 Technical 2.18 2.42 0.24
72 Technical 2.21 2.55 0.34
73 Technical 2.10 2.53 0.43
74 Technical 2.02 2.32 0.30
81 Technical 2.25 2.62 0.37
82 Technical 2.17 2.45 0.28
83 Technical 2.31 2.46 0.15
91 Interpersonal 2.17 2.27 0.10
93 Technical 2.19 2.35 0.16
Source: EU-SILC.
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Figure A1 Evolution of the share of temporary workers by country, adult temps (aged 36–55 years)
and young temps (aged 15–35 years).
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